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Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured
by State Constitutions Outside the Shadow
of the Supreme Court's Constitutional
Remedies Jurisprudence
Gary S. Gildin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal system's willingness to award a viable remedy to persons
harmed by the government's invasion of individual liberty is a vital
component of any regime of constitutional protection. English common
law,' international human rights instruments,2 and the seminal decision
* G. Thomas and Anne G. Miller Chair in Advocacy and Professor of Law, The
Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. B.A. University of
Wisconsin; J.D. Stanford Law School. I thank Allurie Kephart, Sylvia Marakas, Meghan
McClincy and Ashley Zingaretti for their invaluable assistance in research for this article
and Professor Kit Kinports for her typically unerring criticisms of an earlier draft. I am
grateful to Professor Robert Williams for lending his name and prestige to this
Symposium. The title of this article is derived from, and a tribute to, one of his many
path-breaking works on state constitutionalism. See note 12, infra.
0 Gary S. Gildin.
1. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN
FOUR BOOKS 109 (London, A. Strahan 1803) ("[I]t is a [well] settled and invariable
principle in the laws of England, that every right when withheld must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress."); Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.)
(awarding 200 pounds to plaintiff for denial of the right to vote) ("If the plaintiff has a
right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it.... [A]nd indeed it
is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of [a] right and want of [a]
remedy are reciprocal."). See also ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 185 (3d ed. 1889) ("[T]he question [of] whether the right
to personal freedom ... is likely to be secure ... depend[s] a good deal upon the answer
to the inquiry whether the persons who consciously or unconsciously build up[on] the
constitution[s] of their country begin with definitions or declarations of rights, or with the
contrivance of remedies by which rights may be enforced or secured."); Lord Denning,
Misuse of Power, AusTR. L.J. 720, 720 (1981) ("The only admissible remedy for any
[misuse] of power-in a civilized society-is by recourse to law. In order to ensure this
recourse, it is important that the law itself should provide adequate and efficient remedies
for [the] abuse or misuse of power from whatever quarter it may come."); see also Nelles
v. Ontario [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (Can.) ("[A]ccess to a court of competent jurisdiction to
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of the United States Supreme Court establishing the power of judicial
review3 concur that victims of official misconduct must have recourse to
effective relief if limits on governmental power are to be meaningful. It
is essential that money damages to compensate the citizen for injuries
suffered as a result of a constitutional violation be available. For a
person harmed by unconstitutional action that is not likely to recur to that
individual-such as police misconduct-injunctive relief may be
meaningless, if even procurable. Particularly if the successful plaintiff
may not recover attorney's fees,4 absent a damage remedy, victims of
seek a remedy is essential for the vindication of a constitutional wrong. To create a right
without a remedy is antithetical to one of the purposes of the [Canadian] Charter [of
Rights and Freedoms] which surely is to allow the courts to fashion remedies when
constitutional infringements occur.") (emphasis added).
2. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 8, U.N.
GAOR, 3d sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("Everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the [C]onstitution or by law."); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: to ensure that any
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy. .. ."); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, at art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 12, 1965) ("State
Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and
remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against
any acts of racial discrimination . .. as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just
and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such
discrimination."); American Convention on Human Rights art. 25(1), July 18, 1978, 1144
U.N.T.S. 128 ("Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse ... to a competent
court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized
by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though
such violation[s] may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their
official duties.").
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. . . . The government of the United States has
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal ight."). See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980)
("How 'uniquely amiss' it would be . . . if the government itself-'the social organ to
which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and equal
treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social conduct'-were permitted
to disavow liability for the injury it has begotten.") (citation omitted). But see Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 531 (1981) ("In the best of all possible worlds, the District
Court's ... statement that respondent's loss should not go without redress would be an
admirable provision to be contained in a code which governed the administration of
justice in a civil-law jurisdiction. For better or for worse, however, our traditions arise
from the common law of case-by-case reasoning and the establishment of precedent.").
4. The United States Congress has authorized plaintiffs who prevail in actions
against state and local officials and entities for deprivation of federal constitutional rights
to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. By contrast, only a few state
legislatures have provided for an award of fees to citizens who successfully sue to redress
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governmental wrongdoing will have neither the incentive nor the means
to file a civil action to redress the deprivation of their constitutional
rights. As a consequence, government officials may freely ignore
constitutional constraints without formal legal consequence.
Despite the critical importance of remedies to the litigant and to the
overall efficacy of a constitution in restraining the misuse of
governmental authority, judicial prescription of when and from whom
damages are recoverable historically emerges as a second-generation
development. In the initial era of constitutionalism, courts are fully
occupied by the process of defining the substantive scope of
constitutional rights. Only after marshalling a sufficient jurisprudence of
rights do courts tackle the appropriate remedy for losses caused by
violation of those rights.
Federal constitutional limitations on state power tracked this two
stage evolution. In 1927, the Supreme Court first incorporated the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to restrain the states from violating
the citizenry's basic liberty to speak freely.5 Over the succeeding twenty
years, the Court similarly held that other safeguards of the First
state constitutional violations. See, e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-251b (attorney fees
recoverable in civil actions for violation of rights caused by discrimination based upon
religion, national origin, alienage, color, race, sexual orientation, blindness or physical
disability); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 12, §§ 11-1 (allowing reasonable attorney's fees to
plaintiffs where state constitutional rights violated by threats, intimidation or coercion);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 20.107 (2010) (providing for prevailing party attorney fees in cases
involving unlawful discrimination). Absent statutory authorization, the plaintiffs sole
recourse is to persuade the court to exert its inherent authority to award fees to a citizen
enforcing rights as a "private attorney general." Compare New Mexico Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 986 P. 2d 450, 459 (N.M. 1999) (declining to award fees
because private attorney general doctrine lacks sufficient guidelines, is not a traditionally
recognized equitable exception, and would erode policies underlying American rule
under which parties to civil actions bear their own fees absent contractual agreement or
statutory provision) with Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P. 2d 49, 70 (Or. 1998) (prevailing
plaintiff may recover attorney's fees where suit was "seeking to 'vindicate an important
constitutional right applying to all citizens without any gain peculiar to himself,' as
opposed to vindicating 'individualized and different interests', or 'any pecuniary or other
special interest of his own aside from that shared with the public at large."'). See also
Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P. 3d 128, 140 (Mont. 2001) (applying general American rule to
refuse attorney's fees to plaintiff who prevailed in action for damages for violation of
state constitution, while expressly noting that plaintiff had not argued entitlement to fees
under private attorney general theory); Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1021.5 (court may award
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiff in civil action resulting in enforcement of important
right affecting the public interest if a) significant pecuniary or non-pecuniary interest has
been conferred upon general public or large class of persons; b) necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement makes award appropriate; and c) in the interest of justice,
fees should not be paid out of recovery).
5. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927).
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Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.6
In the 1960s, the Court found that various provisions of the Bill of Rights
securing the rights of persons accused of crimes were "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"7 and thus were applicable to states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
While the Court began holding that substantive rights were secured
against state incursion in the 1920s, it was not until 1961 that the Court
began to seriously contemplate the affirmative remedy authorized by 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute creating a civil action to redress
violations of federal constitutional rights caused by persons acting under
color of state law. 9  Over the succeeding half century, the Court
developed a jurisprudence of remedies that defined immunities available
to individual officials and resolved whether local and state governmental
entities could be held liable for constitutional violations caused by their
employees.
The protection of civil liberties under state constitutions has
followed the same two-stage evolution. In theory, state charters stood as
the lone constitutional bulwark against state and local governmental
invasion of freedom until the Supreme Court's incorporation decisions of
the early and mid-twentieth century. In reality, only in the 1970s did
litigants "rediscover" state constitutional rights as an antidote to an
increasingly conservative United States Supreme Court's stingy
interpretation of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
federal constitution.' 0  As was true of the first era of federal
constitutionalism, the energy of litigants and courts construing state
constitutions was initially directed at articulating the boundaries of state
constitutional rights. Rights advocates labored to overcome the state
6. Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (establishment clause);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (free exercise of religious belief);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (right to petition); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707-08
(1931) (freedom of the press).
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
8. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (prohibition of double jeopardy
doctrine); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (trial by jury); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (right to obtain favorable witnesses); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
403-05 (1965) (right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (right
of accused to avoid being compelled to be a witness); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 342-43 (1963) (right to counsel).
9. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). That same year, the Court
approved suppression of evidence as a remedy in state criminal cases; see also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill ofRights, 9
U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
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courts' instinct to interpret state constitutions in lockstep with United
States Supreme Court opinions that denied protection to "analogous"
federal constitutional provisions." Courts and commentators articulated
the rationales for and approaches to independently interpreting state
constitutional provisions. 12 By the end of the twentieth century, failure
of counsel for the rights-claimant to assert that the state constitution
afforded more generous rights than the federal counterpart was
tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel.13
The second generation of state constitutional development is now
emerging. With the methodology of autonomous state constitutional
protection now more defined, courts are turning to the task of
ascertaining the appropriate remedies for persons who have suffered
infringement of a state constitutional right. State courts have not
hesitated to issue declaratory relief or to enjoin unconstitutional conduct.
However, state courts are finding it more difficult to determine when,
and from whom, they should award damages to citizens deprived of their
state constitutional rights.
Absent any other template, state courts (as well as legislatures
contemplating statutes authorizing damage actions) will be tempted to
borrow United States Supreme Court interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in shaping civil relief for infringement of state constitutional rights. 14
For at least three reasons, the Supreme Court's Section 1983 doctrine is
an inappropriate and flawed model for rules governing damages caused
by deprivations of state constitutional rights.
First, just as state constitutions are a source of rights that is
independent of the United States Constitution, the origin of the cause of
action for violation of the state constitution is wholly separate from the
fount of the cause of action to redress breaches of federal constitutional
11. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection ofSupreme Court's Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984).
12. Id. at 356-58. See also Hon. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State
Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
13. See Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 719 A.2d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding
counsel ineffective by failing to challenge warrantless search of car under Article I,
Section 8 of Pennsylvania Constitution, rather than Fourth Amendment to United States
Constitution); Brennan, supra note 10, at 502 ("I suggest to the bar that, although in the
past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state
courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional
questions,").
14. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 7.03 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter FRIESEN] ("[Tihe
attorneys who pioneer the prosecution and defense of state civil rights litigation are likely
to be educated in federal civil rights law. These attorneys, and the state [court] judges
before whom they appear, may be inclined to use federal law as a reference point or even
as a source of persuasive authority for the construction of parallel state remedies for
deprivation of constitutional rights.").
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rights. Limitations on the damage remedy for violation of federal
constitutional rights are founded exclusively in the intent of the 1871
United States Congress that enacted Section 1983. State judges need not,
and should not, be guided by that federal Congress' intent when
determining liability for deprivation of state constitutional rights in civil
actions that are prescribed by the state legislature or implied by state
courts.
Second, it is well settled that the Supreme Court is constrained by
federalism when asked to recognize a right under the United States
Constitution. Likewise, the Court has consistently invoked the policy
that the federal government should not unduly impinge upon state
prerogatives as a basis for denying damages to citizens who have
suffered invasions of federal constitutional rights. However, concerns
over federal incursion on the prerogative of the states do not exist when a
state court enforces the guarantees of the state's own constitution. State
courts have reasoned that an interpretation of state constitutional rights
independent of the Supreme Court's construction of the federal
Constitution is justified by the absence of any issue of federalism. For
this same reason, state courts need not and should not mimic the United
States Supreme Court's federalism-induced remedies jurisprudence when
shaping the legal remedy for violations of rights secured by state
constitutions.'5
Third, the Supreme Court departed from constitutional limits on its
power as well as its entrenched prescriptions for judicial self-limitation
and sound decision-making in seminal opinions limiting the liability of
state and local governments and officers who breach the United States
Constitution. The Court legislated obstacles to relief that a) were not
raised before the lower federal courts; b) were not presented by
advocates before the Court; and c) were not presented by the facts of the
case or necessary to resolve. The Supreme Court's sua sponte
interpretations of Section 1983 often leave citizens injured by
deprivations of fundamental constitutional rights without a meaningful
remedy.
The United States Supreme Court has preferred to promote the
unfettered exercise of governmental decision-making over the competing
goals of deterring constitutional wrongs and compensating losses caused
by impingements on liberty. The Supreme Court's apportionment of the
risk of loss is neither constitutionally mandated nor universally accepted
15. Professor Friesen has cited the difficulty facing courts and attorneys in applying
the complexity of the Court's Section 1983 doctrines as an additional reason why state
courts should not copy assignment of the risk of constitutional loss under federal law.
See FRIESEN, supra note 14, at § 7.03.
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as a matter of policy. Just as state courts may legitimately find rights to
be guaranteed by state constitutions where the United States Supreme
Court has refused to protect the right under the federal Constitution, state
courts are free to adopt a remedial scheme that more generously
compensates the rights-holder and incentivizes the government and its
officials to abide by constitutional constraints.
II. WHY STATE COURTS WILL BE TEMPTED TO FOLLOW THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS ON REMEDIES FOR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Save for the preservation of the writ of habeas corpus and the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment,16 the text of the United
States Constitution is silent as to the relief afforded to a citizen deprived
of a constitutional right. In 1871, the United States Congress filled the
void by enacting a statutory civil action to redress violations of federal
constitutional rights caused by state and local officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . .. to the deprivation of any
rights ... secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party
injured in an[y] action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ... .17
While Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action for damages against
persons acting under color of state or local law who violate the federal
Constitution, the statute does not extend to the deprivation of rights
guaranteed by state constitutions.
Like the federal charter, the texts of state constitutions generally do
not spell out the remedies granted to citizens whose rights have been
infringed by state or local officials.18 In a handful of jurisdictions, the
16. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public safety may require it.").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
18. Most state constitutions include a general textual right to a remedy. See e.g. Pa.
Const. Art. I, § 11 ("All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done to him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without, sale, denial or delay."). Some courts have relied on
these provisions to reject defenses to damages for violation of state constitutions. See
Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P. 3d 128, 140 (Mont. 2002) ("[T]he adoption of qualified
immunity in Montana would also be inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that
courts of justice afford a speedy remedy for those claims recognized by law for injury of
person, property or character."); Ashton v. Brown, 660 A. 2d 447, 464-65 (Md. 1995)
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state legislature has enacted a civil action for damages for invasion of
state constitutional rights.19 A few of these enabling acts are broadly
worded so as to encompass deprivations of all state constitutional
rights.20 Some state legislatures have created causes of action only for
violations of specifically enumerated rights.21 Other statutes restrict the
("[T]he principle that individual state officials should not be immune from suit for state
constitutional violations is bound up with the basic tenet, expressed in Article 19 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, that a plaintiff injured by unconstitutional state action
should have a remedy to redress the wrong."). Other courts have held the open courts
provision does not mandate a right to recover damages for invasions of state
constitutional rights. See Binett v. Sabo, 710 A. 2d 688 (Conn. 1998) (refusing to
recognize cause of action for damages for violation of state constitution in absence of
legislative authorization). See Friesen supra note 14 at §§ 6.02 and 6.04; Donald Marritz,
Courts to be Open: Suits Against the Commonwealth in THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES § 14.1, § 14.1 (Ken Gormley,
Jeffrey Bauman, Joel Fishman and Leslie Kozler, eds., 2004); John H. Bauman, Remedies
Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 237 (1991).
19. See FRIESEN supra note 14, at § 7.08 ("Broad legislative authorization for
constitutional damage claims and attorney fees, long the rule with regard to federal
constitutional rights asserted against state actors, is uncommon so far in the states.").
20. For example, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
105(a) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of this state or any political subdivision subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Arkansas Constitution shall be
liable to the party injured in an action in circuit court for legal and equitable
relief or other proper redress.
The Nebraska statute extends a cause of action to violations of federal as well as state
constitutional rights, but explicitly exempts political subdivisions from liability. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 20-148 (1997). While not supplying a dedicated cause of action to redress
deprivations of rights secured by state constitutions, the New Mexico legislature has
included state constitutional violations in its general Tort Claims Act. The Act requires
the governmental entity to defend a public employee and to pay any damage award
assessed in actions arising out of the employee's tortious conduct, including alleged
violations of the federal or state constitution. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (West 2001).
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:6-2(a), et seq. (West 2004) (providing that the Attorney
General or citizen may bring a civil action for damages or other relief against a person,
"whether or not acting under color of law," who subjects the individual to deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution of New Jersey).
21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(q) (West 1983) (supplying cause of
action in favor of employee disciplined or discharged because of exercise of right of
expression or religious belief guaranteed by state constitution); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 98-E:1 (2008) (while making no explicit reference to state constitution, protecting
public employees' "full right to publicly discuss and give opinions as an individual on all
matters concerning any government[al] entity and its policies."); Florida Civil Rights Act
of 1992, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.01(2) (West 1992) (providing freedom from
discrimination).
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cause of action to state constitutional invasions caused by a public
official who acts with a heightened level of culpability. 2 2
In the vast majority of states, legislatures have not affirmatively
established a civil action to recover damages for the deprivation of state
constitutional rights. Several state courts have approved a damages
action despite the absence of legislative authorization.23 Some of these
courts have looked to the text and constitutional history of the state
constitutional provision in issue and concluded that the drafters intended
that persons deprived of the right be permitted to recover compensation
for their losses. 24  Other courts have authorized a cause of action by
analogy to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,25 where the
Court implied a civil damage action against federal officials. State
judges also have invoked the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A,26
22. See, e.g., Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) (West 2007);
1979 Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 1 1(H)-(I) (West
2002); Maine Civil Rights Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4681(1) (2002); New Jersey
Civil Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:6-2 (West 2004) (private civil rights action
available only where interference with rights was made through "threats, intimidation, or
coercion."). But see TEX. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §104.002(a)(2) (Vernon 2005)
(waiving state's immunity when plaintiff sustains damages from deprivation of state
constitutional right caused by public servant acting "in the course and scope of...
employment;" immunity is not waived, however, where the individual official "acted in
bad faith, with conscious indifference or reckless disregard.").
23. See generally FRIESEN, supra note 14, at § 7.07; Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d
1129 (N.Y. 1996); Jennifer Freisen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights
Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1280-84 (1985); John M. Baker, The Minnesota
Constitution as a Sword: The Evolving Private Cause of Action, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 313 (1994); Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Implied Cause of Action for Damages
for Violation of Provisions of State Constitutions, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619 (2000); Gail H.
Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State Constitutional
Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447 (1998).
24. See Walinski v. Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970). But see
Katzberg v. Regents of University of California, 58 P.2d 339 (Cal. 2002).
25. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
26. Section 874A provides:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or
requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation,
the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of
the purpose[s] of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the
provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a
suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing
tort action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. a (1979). While the text of § 874A
empowers courts to recognize a cause of action to redress violations of "legislative
provisions," comment (a) to the section makes clear that the term embraces provisions of
constitutions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. a (1979) ("As used in this
Section, the term 'legislative provision' includes statutes, ordinances and legislative
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which empowers the judiciary to provide appropriate remedies to assure
the effectiveness of legislatively created rights.2 7 Yet other state courts
have invoked a combination of Bivens and the state's common law or
English common law as the basis for judicially endorsing a cause of
action for damages. 2 8
While some courts have allowed civil damage actions in the absence
of legislative approval, other judges have been loath to fill the remedial
gap. Some state courts have refused to permit persons who have been
deprived of a state constitutional right to recover damages in a civil
action where other adequate remedies are available. 2 9 Other courts have
permitted civil actions to enjoin conduct that violates the state
constitution, but have refused recovery of damages.30 Yet other state
courts have flatly repudiated a cause of action, concluding that the
legislature alone is empowered to establish the claim for damages.3'
The instinct to adopt the United States Supreme Court's remedies
decisions will be particularly strong where the state legislature has
expressly instructed courts to consult Section 1983. The Arkansas Civil
regulations of administrative agencies at various levels of government. It also includes
constitutional provisions.").
27. See Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P. 3d 128, 133-36 (Mont. 2002); Binette v. Sabo,
710 A.2d 688, 693-94 (Conn. 1998).
28. See Bott v. DeLand, 922 P. 2d 732 (Utah 1996); Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d
1081 (La. 1990); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984). See
also Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996) (relying upon Bivens, the
Restatement, and common law in authorizing civil action for damages for violation of
New York Constitution). Cf. Benson v. State, 887 A.2d 525, 534 (Md. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that while private right of damages exists to redress government acts that violate
individual rights secured by state constitution, only injunctive or declaratory relief is
available to remedy provisions of state constitution "addressing principles akin to those
of federalism, separation of powers, and the government's authority to tax.").
29. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Douglas County v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545, 553
(Colo. 1996).
30. See Matthews v. Ala. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 787 So.2d 691, 697 (Ala. 2002)
(determining that individual university officials are entitled to absolute immunity from
damages liability under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, but may be sued for injunctive
relief); Katzberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal. 4th 300, 332 (Cal. 2002) (holding
that neither the language of the state constitution nor the constitutional history indicates
the framers intended to permit damages as a remedy for deprivation of due process;
however, court may issue declaratory relief or an injunction); Bird v. State, 375 N.W. 2d
36, 40-41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that equitable relief, but not money damages,
available to remedy deprivation of due process rights under Minnesota Constitution).
31. Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Provens v. Stark County
Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 594 N.E. 2d 959 (Ohio 1992);
cf City of Jackson v. Sutton, 797 So. 2d 977 (Miss. 2001) (finding that the Mississippi
Tort Claims Act is the exclusive means of seeking damages for conduct alleged to violate
the state constitution). Several states have yet to resolve whether an implied damage
action is available to victims of state constitutional misconduct. See Cantrell v. Morris,
849 N.E. 2d 488 (Ind. 2006); Benjamin v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 980 P.2d 742 (Wash.
1999); Shields v. Gerhart, 582 A.2d 153 (Vt. 1990).
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Rights Act of 1993 provides, "[w]hen construing this section
[authorizing a civil action for state constitutional violations], a court may
look for guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871 ... which decisions and act shall have
persuasive authority only."32 In Jones v. Huckabee,33 the Arkansas
Supreme Court relied upon the United States Supreme Court's
repudiation of vicarious liability under Section 1983 to "[l]ikewise ...
conclude that the doctrine of repondeat superior is not a basis for
liability under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act."34
Even where the state legislature has not directed courts to consult
Section 1983, judges will be tempted to follow the Supreme Court's
Section 1983 decisions when interpreting the state civil rights act. The
language of the few existing state civil rights statutes is typically cast in
general terms. The statutes do not always prescribe the immunity
available to individual public officials and entities. Also, the statutes do
not necessarily specify whether state and local entities are vicariously
liable for all state constitutional violations committed by their public
servants. Absent unambiguous guidance from the statutory text, courts
may turn to what superficially appears to be the most analogous
authority-relevant Supreme Court doctrine on defenses available to
those same state and local officials and entities when they violate the
federal constitution.35
Where the court implies a civil action to redress breaches of the
state constitution in the absence of legislative authorization, the Supreme
Court's Section 1983 jurisprudence is more alluring. With no statutory
text to interpret, state judges may find case law on remedies for the
infringement of federal constitutional rights to be the only available
guide to their analysis. For example, in defining the defenses available
in judicially created damage actions for deprivation of rights secured by
the New Jersey Constitution, the Superior Court of New Jersey reasoned
"[a] conflict between New Jersey law and federal law with respect to
immunity rules is not in the public interest. It follows . .. that the
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (2003).
33. Jones v. Huckabee, 250 S.W.3d 241 (Ark. 2007).
34. Id. at 246.
35. See Morris, 849 N.E. 2d at 488 (applying qualified immunity standard for federal
Section 1983 actions to claims against government official under Indiana Tort Claims
Act); Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Me. 1994) (relying upon the United
States Supreme Court's ruling that states are not "persons" under Section 1983 to hold
state may not be sued for violation of state constitution under Maine Civil Rights Act
(MCRA) and further holding that qualified immunity analysis under Section 1983 applies
to MCRA); Leland v. State, 2001 Me. Super. LEXIS 55 (Superior Court 2001) (quoting
Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)) (holding that a suit
against state trooper in his official capacity under Maine Civil Rights Act is to be deemed
a suit against the state, which is not a "person" under the Act).
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immunities of municipalities and their officials sued directly under our
constitution are identical to those provided by federal law." 36 The court
further held that, as under Section 1983, local governments are liable for
invasions of state constitutional rights only where the official's action
represents the policy of the municipality.
The state courts' instinct to clone the United States Supreme Court's
Section 1983 doctrines, while understandable, is nonetheless misplaced.
As discussed below, the Supreme Court has erected three significant
obstacles to recovering damages for deprivation of federal constitutional
rights. Purportedly, each of the hurdles is founded in the intent of the
1871 Congress that enacted Section 1983. The intent of that Congress
does not bind, and should not guide, state courts crafting remedies for
deprivations of state constitutional rights.
III. THREE FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
PURPORTEDLY ARE ROOTED IN THE INTENT OF THE 1871
CONGRESS THAT PRESCRIBED THE REMEDY FOR DEPRIVATIONS OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The unqualified language and legislative history of Section 1983
suggest that the statute would furnish a generous remedy to victims of
governmental misconduct. The statute provides that "every person"
acting under color of state law who deprives an individual of federal
constitutional rights "shall be liable to the party injured."38 Supporters
and opponents alike acknowledged the breadth of the remedy that
Section 1983 imparted to citizens whose federal constitutional rights
were invaded. Senator Edmunds, the manager of the bill in the Senate,
opined the statute "[is] so very simple and really [reenacts] the
Constitution," only adding the civil remedy missing from the charter.3 9
36. Lloyd v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 432 A.2d 572, 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1981). See also Cantrell, 849 N.E. 2d at 488 (finding that qualified immunity governing
Section 1983 actions similarly applies to claims against government officials alleged to
have violated Article I, Section 9 of Indiana Constitution); Moresi v. State, 567 So.2d
1081, 1093 (La. 1990) ("The same factors that compelled the United States Supreme
Court to recognize qualified good faith immunity under Section 1983 requires us to
recognize a similar immunity for them under any action arising from the state
constitution.").
37. Lloyd, 432 A.2d at 583; see also Smith v. Mich. Dep't of Public Health, 410
N.W.2d 749, 794 (Mich. 1987) (Boyle, J., concurring) (determining that liability of state
entities for deprivations of state constitutional rights should be limited to cases where
states would be liable under § 1983 absent Eleventh Amendment immunity).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
39. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978) (citing CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568-69 (1871)). Similarly, Representative Bingham "declared the
bill's purpose to be 'the enforcement . .. of the Constitution on behalf of every individual
citizen of the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the
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Opposing the bill, Senator Thurman observed, "[there] is no limitation
whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, and they are as
comprehensive as can be used." 4 0 Representative Shellabarger advised
that, as is characteristic of remedial statutes designed to protect
individual liberty, Section 1983 is to be "liberally and beneficently
construed" to afford a remedy to the aggrieved citizen.4 1
Despite the unbounded language and the legislative instruction to
broadly and liberally construe the statute to extend a remedy, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1983 has erected three often
insurmountable obstacles to recovering damages caused by the violation
of federal constitutional rights.
First, the Court has held that individual state and local officers sued
under Section 1983 may assert either absolute or qualified immunity
from liability for damages. 42  Even those officials protected only by
qualified immunity escape liability for infringing constitutional rights
whenever the right violated is not "clearly established"-even where that
official acts maliciously.43
Second, the Court has held that local governments are not
vicariously liable for deprivations of constitutional rights caused by
public officials. Rather, the entity is liable only where the employee's
unconstitutional act represents municipal "policy" or "custom."44
Consequently, where a local official successfully invokes individual
immunity and his conduct does not represent "policy or custom," the
innocent citizen whose federal constitutional rights have been violated
will not recover damages for his harms.
Constitution."' Monell, 436 U.S. at 685 n.45 (citing CONG. GLOBE App., 42d Cong., Ist
Sess. 81 (1871)).
40. Monell, 436 U.S. at 685 n.45 (citing CONG. GLOBE App., 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
216-17 (1871)); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179-80 (1961).
41. Monell, 436 U.S. at 684 (citing CONG. GLOBE App., 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 68
(1871)) ("Th[e] [A]ct is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and
human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are
liberally and beneficently construed. It would be most strange and, in civilized law,
monstrous were this not the rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided
by your own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is
wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is
uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to
protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people....) Chief
Justice Jay and also Story say, "Where a power is remedial in its nature there is much
reason to contend that it ought to be construed liberally, and it is generally adopted in the
interpretation of laws." I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 429 (1833), available at http://mtweb.mtsu.edulcewillis/Hermeneutics/
Story%20Commentaries%201nterpretation.pdf.
42. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
43. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1982).
44. Monell, 436 U.S. at 713-14 (1978).
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Third, the Court has held that state governmental entities may never
be held liable for damages under Section 1983.45 As a result, whenever
the state official who causes a constitutional violation is immune under
Section 1983, the citizen who suffered the constitutional wrong is denied
any compensation for his injuries.
These barriers to damages are not vested in either constitutional
impediments to liability or a considered policy assessment of the
appropriate allocation of the risk of constitutional loss. Instead, the
Supreme Court purported to find each of the three doctrines sheltering
state and local officials and entities from damages liability dictated by
the intent of the United States Congress that enacted Section 1983.
A. The Immunity of Individual Officers is Derived from the Intent of
the 1871 Congress to Incorporate Common Law Immunities
Individual state and local officials' immunity from liability for
damages originates in the intent of the Congress that enacted Section
1983. The only immunity set forth in the United States Constitution is
the clause that protects legislators from being challenged "for any
[s]peech or [d]ebate."4 6 The language of Section 1983 likewise makes
no mention of immunity. Notwithstanding the absence of immunity in
the Constitution or the text of the statute, the Supreme Court held that the
1871 Congress did not mean to hold individual officials liable for
damages whenever they cross constitutional lines. By failing to
expressly abrogate common-law immunity, the Court reasoned, Congress
intended to permit individual officials to assert immunities that were well
established when Congress passed Section 1983.47 As of 1871, judges
were absolutely immune at common law from suits for damages
complaining of judicial acts within their jurisdiction. 48 Accordingly, they
could invoke that same immunity in actions for damages under Section
1983 for violations of the United States Constitution.4 9 At common law,
police officers sued for wrongful arrest were freed from liability where
45. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
46. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any [s]peech or [d]ebate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other [pilace.").
47. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (holding that judges have
absolute immunity for judicial acts within their jurisdiction); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (finding that legislators have absolute immunity for acts within their
legislative foundation). But see Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 346 (1983) (Marshall. J.,
dissenting) ("The extension of absolute immunity conflicts fundamentally with the
language and purpose of the statute. I would therefore be reluctant in any case to
conclude that § 1983 incorporates common-law tort immunities that may have existed
when Congress enacted the statute in 1871.").
48. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54.
49. Id. at 554-55.
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they acted objectively with probable cause and subjectively in good
faith.o Consequently, law enforcement officials could assert the same
common law qualified immunity when named as defendants in Section
1983 damage actions.51
The Supreme Court subsequently legislated a qualified immunity
standard that significantly expanded the bounds of common law
immunity. However, the Court has never renounced the view that the
genesis of individual immunity under Section 1983 is Congress' intent to
incorporate immunities entrenched at common law in 1871. In Antoine
v. Byers,52 the Court refused to accord absolute immunity to a court
reporter whose failure to timely produce a trial transcript delayed a
criminal appeal until four years following conviction. The Court
reasoned, "[ijn determining which officials perform functions that might
justify a full exemption from liability, 'we have undertaken 'a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at
common law and the interests behind it."' 53  Because courts did not
utilize official court reporters until the late nineteenth century, they had
no immunity at common law as of 187 1.54 Therefore, the court reporter
was not shielded by absolute immunity under Section 1983. Similarly, in
Tower v. Glover,5 5 the Court denied immunity to public defenders
because they were not protected by common law immunity when
Congress enacted Section 1983. The Court reaffirmed Congress'
contemplation that immunity under Section 1983 would attach only
where the official was extended immunity at common law.
50. Id. at 555.
51. Id. at 557.
52. Antoine v. Byers, 508 U.S. 429 (1993).
53. Id. at 432 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 433.
55. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
56. Tower, 467 U.S. at 920-21. As the first public defender program in the United
States was opened in 1914, American common law immunity would not have immunized
criminal defense counsel as of 1871. The Court also explored whether English common
law extended immunity to barristers, who like public defenders could not select their
clients. While barristers in England were immune from negligent actions, they could not
successfully interpose that defense in actions for intentional wrongs. Id. at 921.
57. Id. at 920. See also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (finding that
guards employed by a private management firm may not assert qualified immunity under
Section 1983 because neither English nor American law conferred immunity upon private
jailers). The Court also denied absolute immunity to a state police officer sued for
allegedly submitting a complaint and an affidavit that failed to establish probable cause,
stating, "[w]e reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting
§ 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting
Congress' intent by the common-law tradition." See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342
(1986).
Despite declaiming power to prescribe immunity beyond that accorded at common
law as of 1871, the Court extended absolute immunity to prosecutors sued for initiating
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B. The Supreme Court Based the Rejection of Vicarious Liability of
Local Governmental Entities Under Section 1983 Wholly on the
Intent of the 1871 Congress
The Supreme Court's ruling that local governmental entities are not
vicariously liable for constitutional infractions of their employees also
rests entirely on the intent of the Congress that enacted Section 1983. In
Monroe v. Pape," the first high Court interpretation of local government
liability, the Court held that Congress did not intend to include municipal
entities among the "persons" suable under Section 1983.59 The decision
in Monroe turned solely upon Congress's rejection of the Sherman
Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 .60 The Sherman
Amendment, proposed as a response to local officials' inability or
unwillingness to restrain the violent activities of the Ku Klux Klan,
would have held local governmental entities liable for failing to prevent
all acts of violence within their boundaries. 6 1  The Monroe Court
reasoned that the defeat of the Sherman Amendment reflected a
congressional antipathy to any suits against municipalities under Section
1983.62
Seventeen years later, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of
the City of New York, 3 the Court ruled it had erred by equating
Congress' repudiation of the Sherman Amendment with the legislature's
intent to reject all forms of municipal liability. The Monell Court noted
the Sherman Amendment did not seek to modify the section of the 1871
Civil Rights Act that became codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but instead
was proposed and debated independently as a separate section of the
Act.64 Furthermore, the Sherman Amendment would have held a local
government liable for private acts of violence, even where the state had
not empowered the locality to create a police force to forestall those
criminal actions by relying on cases decided after 1871 and policy considerations
justifying immunity for judges and jurors. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 n. 11
(1997). The Court also has presumed any state or local official not protected by absolute
immunity may invoke the qualified immunity defense, without inquiring whether
common law afforded any immunity to the official. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 569 n.3 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
59. See generally id.
60. Id. at 188-91.
61. Id. at 174-76.
62. Id. at 191. Given its view of Congress's intent, the Court expressly refused to
consider plaintiffs argument that it was necessary to hold municipalities accountable for
damages as a matter of policy because a) remedies against individual officials are
ineffective, and b) entity liability would create incentives for institutional changes to
eliminate the unconstitutional conduct. Id.
63. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
64. Id. at 666.
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unlawful acts. 5 Opponents of the Sherman Amendment argued that by
obligating municipalities to keep the peace, the federal government
would invade the exclusive constitutional province of the states to
determine the duties of their local governmental entities-including
whether to authorize municipal law enforcement.66
The constitutional flaw in the Sherman Amendment extended only
to the language which held local governments accountable for failing to
prevent wrongful acts of private persons. Congress inarguably harbors
the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose
liability on local governments for acts of their agents that trespass upon
the Constitution.68  Therefore, the Court reasoned, rejection of the
Sherman Amendment did not signal the legislature's intent with respect
to a municipality's liability for its own officials' violation of the
Constitution.
Having undermined the lone basis for the rejection of local
governmental liability in Monroe, the Monell Court began the analysis
anew. The Court concluded that both the language69 and the legislative
history70 of Section 1983 indicated that the 1871 Congress intended to
subject local governments to suit.
65. Id at 666-68.
66. Id. at 673.
67. See id. at 679.
68. See id at 683 n.44.
69. See id. at 683. The Court reasoned the word "person" extended to local
government, because as of 1871 it was settled that corporations-including municipal
corporations-were deemed natural persons in both constitutional and statutory analysis.
Id. at 687. Furthermore, mere months before the passage of Section 1983, Congress had
enacted the Dictionary Act. Id. at 688. That Act provided, "in all acts hereafter
passed ... the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a
more limited sense." Id. (quoting Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431). Were the
definition of "person" to be allowable rather than mandatory, as the Court had asserted in
Monroe, the Act would cease to function as a dictionary. Monell, 436 U.S. at 689 n.53
(1976). Obviously under this definition, local governments were "persons."
70. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The legislative record
corroborated the Court's construction of the word "person" to embrace local
governments. Because the act was remedial, it was to be "liberally and beneficently
construed," with the language of the statute to be given "the largest latitude consistent
with the words employed." Id. at 684 (citing CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 68
(1871)). In discussing Section 1983, Representative Bingham indicated he had authored
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to correct the unjust result in Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), where the Supreme Court had held the Bill of
Rights constrained federal but not local government, and consequently provided no
redress for a city's taking of private property for public use. Monell, 436 U.S. at 686-87
(citing CONG. GLOBE APP., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1871). Finally, the Court observed,
as of 1871 municipalities had been held liable in damages for common law wrongs. Id. at
687 n.47.
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While reversing the Monroe Court's wholesale repudiation of
municipal liability, the Monell Court further held that the 1871 Congress
did not intend to hold a local government vicariously liable for all
infringements of constitutional rights committed by its officials. 7  The
Court believed that vicarious liability could not be squared with the
textual requirement that a plaintiff prove the government defendant
"caused" the constitutional infringement. 7 2 The Court further reasoned
that since Congress rejected a form of vicarious liability proposed in the
Sherman Amendment, Congress therefore could not have meant to
embrace respondeat superior liability under Section 1983.73 Instead,
local entities would be suable only where the unconstitutional conduct of
their employees "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
officers" or was "visited pursuant to [a] governmental 'custom' even
though [that] custom has not received formal approval through the
body's official decisionmaking channels."7 4
The Monell Court expressly declined to undertake its own
assessment of whether the complementary goals of compensating victims
of constitutional wrongs and deterring governmental misconduct merited
vicarious municipal liability. The Court simply concluded that Congress
rejected those policies when it defeated the Sherman Amendment.7 5
Thus, like the doctrine of individual immunity, rejection of vicarious
liability of local governmental entities under Section 1983 is based
wholly on the avowed intent of the 1871 Congress.
71. Id at 691.
72. Id. at 692. The Court cited Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) where the Court
had rejected holding an individual supervisor vicariously liable for actions of line
officers. The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes liability only on the employer, not
on the supervisor. Hence, rejection of vicarious supervisory liability in Rizzo says
nothing about the appropriateness of vicarious liability of the City, who is the employer.
73. The Court recognized Congress' repudiation of unprecedented vicarious liability
for acts of private individuals under the Sherman Act did not necessarily reflect hostility
towards holding local government liable for the constitutional harms inflicted by its
employees. Yet it believed that the legislature's constitutional objection to holding local
governments liable for failing to prevent private acts of violence extended equally to
imposing liability on local governments for its own officers' invasions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
74. Id. at 690-91.
75. See id. at 694. Unlike its immunity decisions, the Court did not inquire whether
local governments were vicariously liable at common law. As the Court later conceded,
the Congress debating Section 1983 acknowledged that as of 1871 courts had held local
governments vicariously liable for the torts of their agents when acting in the scope of
their employment. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1980).
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C. The Supreme Court Predicated Exemption ofStates From Liability
Under Section 1983 Exclusively on the Intent of the 1871 Congress
When a citizen attempts to hold state, as opposed to local,
governmental entities liable under Section 1983 for damages for
constitutional wrongdoing, the plaintiff faces an additional obstacle-the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The text of the
Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of the power to entertain
suits against a state by a citizen of another state. In Hans v.
Louisiana,n however, the Court ruled the Amendment equally bars suits
against a state lodged by one of its own citizens. The Eleventh
Amendment is not an insuperable barrier to holding states accountable
for damages caused by deprivations of liberties guaranteed by the federal
Constitution. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,79 the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress has the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from unconsented
suits in federal court. State liability under Section 1983 thus turns on
whether the 1871 Congress intended to override the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity and to subject state governmental entities to
actions for damages in federal court.
The Supreme Court took its first stab at discerning the intent of
Congress in Edelman v. Jordan.80 The Edelman Court held that by
enacting Section 1983, Congress did not intend to authorize federal
courts to order disbursement of funds from the state treasury to
76. "The [j]udicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
[s]tate. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
77. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
78. Id. By adopting the fiction that a state official who offends the United States
Constitution is "stripped of his official or representative character and is subject[] . . .to
the consequences of his [official] conduct," the Supreme Court has permitted federal
courts to issue injunctions against state officials in their official capacity to prospectively
bar invasions of the federal Constitution. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
However, where the relief retroactively would require disbursement of funds from the
state treasury, the fiction is pierced and the action is deemed one against the State under
the Eleventh Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
79. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Fitzpatrick Court ruled Congress
possessed power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which approved suits in federal court against state entities that
discriminate in employment "on the basis of 'race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' Id. at 447-48 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV)).
See also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (while the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified after the Eleventh Amendment, empowers Congress to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment, no such power exists under the Commerce Clause and Indian
Commerce Clause adopted before the Eleventh Amendment).
80. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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compensate citizens harmed by the unconstitutional administration of the
Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled Program.8 1 The Court's reasoning
on the issue consisted of a single sentence, unsupported by citation to
any authority: "[It has not heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was
intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity
merely because an action could be brought under that section against
state officers, rather than against the State itself."82
The Court supplied the missing citation two years later. In
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,8 3 the Court explained why in Edelman it had found
that Congress did not intend to subject states to suit when it enacted
Section 1983: "The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had
been held in Monroe v. Pape [citation omitted] to exclude cities and
other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the case, it could
not have been intended to include States as parties defendant." 84
It was after issuing its opinion in Fitzpatrick that the Court in
Monell held that Congress did intend to hold local governments liable
under Section 1983. In overruling Monroe v. Pape, Monell undermined
the lone basis for the Edelman Court's ruling that Congress had not
intended to subject states to suit in federal court to redress deprivations
of rights secured by the Constitution.
The Court revisited the issue of the liability of states under Section
1983 in Quern v. Jordan.85 The Court reaffirmed that Congress did not
intend to override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
enacted Section 1983. The Court presumed that if Congress had
intended to abrogate the states' traditional exemption from suit in federal
court, both supporters and opponents would have extensively debated the
issue.86 The Court found no reference to the Eleventh Amendment or the
financial consequences to the states in the legislative record. Therefore,
81. Id. at 676-77.
82. Id.
83. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
84. Id. at 452.
85. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). While the Quern Court saw fit to revisit
Congress' intent to hold states liable under Section 1983, neither party before the Court
briefed or argued that issue. See infra Section VI.
86. See id at 343. The Quern Court believed the text of Section 1983 was
insufficiently specific to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 341. The Court
rejected the definition of the word "person" codified in the Dictionary Act, passed two
months before Section 1983, finding that Act supplied only a "few general rules for the
construction of statutes." Id. at 341 n. 11 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess.,
1474 (1871)). However, the Quern Court's construction of the Dictionary Act
contradicts its interpretation of the Act in Monell. See supra note 69.
[Vol. 115:4896
REDRESSING DEPRIVATIONS OF RIGHTS
the majority reasoned, Congress must have intended to preserve the
states' historic immunity.8 7
As was true of its recognition of individual immunity and rejection
of vicarious liability of local governments, the Court's repudiation of
state liability for damages under Section 1983 turns exclusively on the
Court's interpretation of the intent of the 1871 Congress, The Court did
not find that the Constitution mandated these obstacles to recovery of
damages. Nor did the Court contend that these impediments to liability
reflected the desired level of compensation for and deterrence of
constitutional violations.8 8
87. Quern, 440 U.S. at 343. The United States Supreme Court first held the
Eleventh Amendment extended beyond its text barring suits against a State by its own
citizen, nineteen years after passage of Section 1983. Thus, Congress would not
necessarily have debated the ramifications of the Eleventh Amendment in enacting
Section 1983, which principally sought to provide a remedy to citizens victimized by
their home State's inability or unwillingness to secure rights newly guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified just
three years before Section 1983, entrenching in the Constitution "a vast transformation
from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century ... Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). As Section 1983 was a product of that same federal-
state recalibration, id., one might not expect to see a reprise of the debate over federalism
that had recently been resolved in favor of increased federal power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (express waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in language of statute not required where the legislation is enacted
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). However, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
was found in the debates surrounding Section 1983 arguments of both supporters and
opponents of Section 1983 regarding the statute's extension to states. See Quern, 440
U.S. at 357-65 (Brennan, J., concurring).
After Quern closed the door to Section 1983 damage actions against states in federal
courts, plaintiffs sought to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's bar by filing suit in state
court. Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980). In Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police, the Supreme Court put a halt to this tactic, holding states are
not suable "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). As in Quern, the Will Court's rejection of state liability
for damages singularly rested on the intent of the 1871 Congress. See id at 65-67.
Indeed, much of the majority's analysis followed from its construction of Congress'
intent in Quern. See id. at 66. The Court also pointed to the disruption in the allocation
of federal and state power that would be caused by state liability, invoking "the ordinary
rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intent[ ] to do
so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
88. The nearest the Quern Court came to considering the implication of its holding
on risk allocation was its conclusory statement "[n]or does [repudiation of liability for
damages] render § 1983 meaningless insofar as States are concerned." Quern, 440 U.S.
at 345 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The Court's optimism that states
will be sufficiently deterred by the potential for injunctive relief, however, does not
answer why the victim should not be compensated whenever the state official who caused
the constitutional deprivation prevails on the qualified immunity defense. Furthermore,
the Court's faith in the deterrent effect exerted by suits against state officials for
prospective relief is belied by its ruling that a) injunctive relief is "to be used sparingly"
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IV. STATE COURTS NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT FOLLOW THE INTENT
OF THE FEDERAL CONGRESS THAT ENACTED SECTION 1983 IN
REMEDYING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS
Since the United States Supreme Court decisions limiting damages
liability for federal constitutional violations are rooted in the intent of the
federal Congress that enacted Section 1983, state courts must consult
these opinions in suits for damages for violation of the state constitution
only when two factors are present. First, the source of the civil action
must be a state statute. Second, the state legislature that approved the
damage action for deprivation of state constitutional rights must have
intended to incorporate the United States Supreme Court interpretations
of the intent of the 1871 federal Congress that enacted Section 1983. In
all other instances, state courts are neither bound nor advised to graft
Section 1983 jurisprudence on to state constitutional claims.
A. Actions for Violation of the State Constitution Authorized by the
Legislature
The intent of the 1871 Congress certainly is relevant where the
action for damages resulting from violations of the state constitution is
authorized by legislation that is meant to be informed by Section 1983.
The Arkansas Civil Rights Act expressly provides that a "court may look
for guidance" to court decisions interpreting Section 1983, and those
decisions "shall have persuasive authority only."8 Given the textual
instruction to consult Section 1983, the Arkansas Supreme Court
appropriately considered the United States Supreme Court's rejection of
vicarious liability under Section 1983 in ruling that the Arkansas Civil
Rights Act does not create respondeat superior liability for infringement
of the state constitution.90
and only "in the most extraordinary circumstances" because of "the well-established rule
that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of
its own internal affairs,"' Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 378-79 (citations omitted);
(b) equitable relief is more offensive "to principles of federalism" than an award of
damages, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 133 (1983); and c) the Article III
case and controversy requirement deprives federal courts of power to enjoin patently
unconstitutional conduct unless the victim can demonstrate a "real and immediate" rather
than "conjectural" or "hypothetical" risk of being subjected to the invasion in the future.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02.
89. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (2010).
90. Jones v. Huckabee, 250 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Ark. 2007). While the Arkansas
Supreme Court properly was "guided by," the United States Supreme Court's repudiation
of vicarious liability, the Court did not engage in the required analysis to determine
whether the rationale for rejection of vicarious liability was "persuasive." The 1871
Congress' repudiation of the Sherman Amendment was based upon considerations of
federalism that are irrelevant where a state court enforces constitutional norms against its
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Even where the text of the state statute authorizing a civil damage
action does not explicitly instruct judges to look to interpretations of
Section 1983, state courts should consult the United States Supreme
Court's decisions where the history of the statute indicates that the
legislature intended to incorporate Section 1983 doctrines. After
reviewing the Governor's legislative file, which included the history of
the enactment process and statements concerning the nature and effect of
the proposed law, the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded the
legislature that enacted the 1979 Massachusetts Civil Rights Act91
intended to create a remedy that is "coextensive" with Section 1983 .92
However, the Court subsequently reasoned that the legislature's intent to
adopt Section 1983 extended only to judicial interpretations issued as of
the date the state civil rights act was passed. In Duarte v. Healy," the
Court held the Massachusetts legislature would have been aware of, and
intended to approve, the then-existing test for qualified immunity of state
and local officials sued under Section 1983 for discretionary functions.94
The Court emphasized it was applying only Section 1983 doctrine that
was in place when the legislature enacted the state civil rights act,
believing subsequent Supreme Court decisions had not changed the test
for qualified immunity under Section 1983.95 The court expressly
cautioned that "[w]e have had no occasion to consider whether it is
appropriate under the Civil Rights Act to adopt all of the current
Supreme Court precedent under § 1983 .96
Where the state legislature that enacted a civil rights act did not
intend to adopt Section 1983 doctrine, state courts interpreting the act
should not incorporate the obstacles to relief endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court. For example, in Venegas v. County of Los
Angeles,7 the California Court of Appeals properly refused to allow state
own officials and entities. See infra Section V. Furthermore, the Monell Court never
considered the fact that local governments were vicariously liable under state common
law. See supra note 69.
91. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 12, § 11 (H and 1) (West 2002).
92. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1130-31 (Mass. 1985)
(Construction of when plaintiff "prevails" for purposes of recovering attorney's fees in
action under state civil rights act should be the same as determination when a plaintiff is
prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
93. Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E. 2d 1232 (1989).
94. See generally id
95. Id. at 1232. The Court was mistaken when it concluded that the qualified
immunity standard had not changed since 1979. Among other things the Supreme Court
abrogated the requirement that an official must subjectively act in good faith to be
immune. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). While citing Harlow, the Duarte
Court assumed immunity was governed by a two-part test, requiring the official to satisfy
both objective and subjective tiers. Duarte, 537 N.E. 2d at 1232.
96. Duarte, 537 N.E. 2d at 1237.
97. Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. Rptr.3d 741 (Cal. App. 2007).
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officials to assert the Section 1983 qualified immunity defense in an
action for damages arising out of a violation of the search and seizure
protections of the California Constitution. Plaintiff brought his claim
under Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code, which authorizes a
damage action against those who, by threats, intimidation or coercion,
interfere with rights secured by the state constitution." The language of
Section 52.1 makes no mention of immunity. 99 At the time it enacted
Section 52.1, the California legislature was fully aware of how to express
an intent to prescribe immunity in the language of its enactments.100
Thus, the Venengas court concluded, the legislature's election not to
include any immunity, either when it originally enacted Section 52.1 or
amended the statute to provide a civil remedy, indicated that the
legislature did not intend to recognize the Section 1983 immunity
defense in actions for damages caused by deprivation of state
constitutional rights.
The court in Venengas supported its construction of the statutory
language by using the Civil Code's legislative history. The legislative
record of the 1990 amendment providing a civil damage remedy included
no mention of either a statutory immunity or an immunity established by
court decisions. 01
Finally, the origin of qualified immunity under Section 1983
reinforced the court's conclusion that the California legislature did not
intend to adopt that immunity defense. The court recognized that the
source of Section 1983 immunity is Congress' presumed intent to
incorporate immunities recognized at common law in 1871. The court
reasoned that the California legislature would not have intended to
incorporate common law immunities from 1871 when it provided a civil
remedy in 1990, particularly since the legislature already had abolished
common law immunity for tort liability.10 2
98. CAL. CIV. CODE. §52.1(a) (West 2007).
99. Id.
100. The legislature had conferred immunity from civil liability for false arrest upon
police officers who "had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful," CAL. PENAL
CODE § 847(b)(1)(West 2007), or who made the arrest "pursuant to a warrant of arrest
regular upon its face if the peace officer in making the arrest acts without malice and in
the reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one referred to in the warrant." CAL.
Civ. CODE § 43.55(a) (West 2007).
101. Venegas, 63 Cal. Rptr.3d at 751.
102. Venegas, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 753. For the same reason, the court rejected the
argument that the California legislature intended to adopt Massachusetts court decisions
extending Section 1983 qualified immunity to officials sued under the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act. The court found illogical the Massachusetts court's decision to apply
1871 common law immunity to its Civil Rights Act rather than immunities prescribed by
the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Venegas, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 753. See also
Washington v. Robertson County, 29 S.W. 3d 466 (Tenn. 2000) (rejecting argument that
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B. Actions for Violation of the State Constitution Authorized by the
Judiciary
The case for ignoring Section 1983 remedies jurisprudence is even
stronger where the cause of action for deprivation of state constitutional
rights is authorized by the judiciary rather than the legislature. Under
these circumstances, the court is neither interpreting a statutory text nor
construing a legislative intent that incorporates Section 1983. The
appropriate starting point for ascertaining rules for liability for state
constitutional violations then is state law, not the intent of the 1871
federal Congress. As Maryland's highest court reasoned in DiPino v.
Davis,
Although, as noted, the State Constitutional provisions allegedly
violated here mirror, for the most part, the Federal provisions
underlying the Section 1983 action, different rules apply with respect
to the remedies available for those violations.... [T]he right of
recovery for Federal violations arises from statute-§ 1983-whereas
the redress for state violations is through a common law action for
damages.103
Adopting the Supreme Court's interpretations of Section 1983 is
especially problematic where the intent of the federal Congress that
enacted Section 1983 is contrary to state law. In Dorwart v. Caraway,104
the Montana Supreme Court applied the United States Supreme Court's
qualified immunity test to the count of plaintiffs complaint that alleged
city is liable only for custom or policy under Tennessee statute providing civil cause of
action for malicious harassment, where no language in the act limits governmental
liability to acts furthering custom or policy and respondeat superior liability is well
settled under common law).
103. DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 371 (Md. 1999) (local government may be liable
for violation of federal constitution only where official's actions represent custom or
policy but is vicariously liable for violation of state constitution). See also Fleming v.
City of Bridgeport, 935 A.2d 126 (Conn. 2007) (applying United States Supreme Court
qualified immunity test to claim under Section 1983 while applying different state
common law immunity standard to claim for deprivation of rights secured by state
constitution); Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 (Mont. 2002) (applying federal qualified
immunity test to Section 1983 but refusing to create analogous immunity for claim under
state constitution); Brown v. State of New York, 674 N.E. 2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996) (rejection
of vicarious liability of governmental entities for federal constitution violation is based
upon interpretation of federal statute that is inapposite to actions based on state
constitution governed by state statute imposing vicarious liability); Ashton v. Brown, 660
A.2d 447 (Md. 1995) (individual officer may assert qualified immunity to Section 1983
count but may not assert any immunity to count complaining of infringement of state
constitutional right); Ross/Pitts v. Cramer, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 206 (Del. Super. Ct.
1998) (applying state law immunity standard, less protective of officials, to prisoner's
allegation of pattern of racial discrimination violative of Delaware constitution).
104. Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 (Mont. 2002).
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local officers conducted a search and seizure that violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.105 However,
the court refused to recognize any immunity under the count of the
complaint that averred the officers' actions contravened the right to
privacy and right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. Immunity under Section 1983,
the court reasoned, is founded in Congress' intent to incorporate "deeply
rooted common law traditions for immunity." 06 By contrast, Montana
had no tradition of immunity; in fact, the Montana Constitution prohibits
immunity except where specifically provided by a two-thirds vote of
each house of the legislature.10 7
C. Applicability of State Statutory and Common Law Defenses to
Actions for Violation of the State Constitution
Once courts properly look to state law rather than Section 1983 as
the source of defenses to liability, a separate issue emerges. While
defenses provided by the state constitution obviously apply, state courts
should not necessarily recognize obstacles to liability that emanate from
state statutory and common law.
Of course, provisions of the state constitution that squarely address
liability and immunity should govern damage actions for deprivations of
state constitutional rights. Courts correctly have shielded states from
liability where the state constitution prescribes immunity.'0 8 Conversely,
where the state constitution prohibits immunity, courts should not permit
individuals and entities sued for invasion of rights secured by the state
charter to assert immunity as a defense to liability.' 09
State courts are divided over whether the government may assert
defenses established by state statutory and common law in suits seeking
damages for breaches of the state constitution. Some courts have held
105. Id. at 143.
106. Id. at 140.
107. Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, §18). Where state law holds governmental
entities vicariously liable for wrongs of their officials, state courts similarly have declined
to follow the Supreme Court's rejection of respondeat superior liability under Section
1983. DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354 (Md. 1999); Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129
(N.Y. 1996); Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995).
108. McKenna v. Julian, 763 N.W.2d 384 (Nev. 2009) (fact that state constitutional
right violated was self-executing does not constitute waiver of state's sovereign inunuity
prescribed by Nebraska Constitution); Ross/Pitts v. Cramer, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 206
(Del. Super. Ct. June 16, 1998) (Article I, § 9 of Delaware Constitution bars suits against
state employees in their official capacities unless the state consents).
109. See Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 128.
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state statuteso and common law doctrines"' limiting the liability of
entities and public officials apply equally to civil actions complaining of
violation of the state constitution. However, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has recognized that the rationale of defenses created by state
statutes and common law doctrines do not automatically extend to
actions for invasion of the state constitution. In Clea v. Mayor and City
Council of Maryland,l12 the plaintiffs sued Baltimore police officer
Robert Leonard for unlawfully searching their house. Leonard
conducted the search pursuant to a warrant that mistakenly listed the
Clea's address rather than the address of the intended subject of the
search, Adam Thomas. Maryland common law immunizes public
officials from civil liability for discretionary acts unless they act with
malice. The court ruled that because Officer Leonard did not act
maliciously, he was immune from liability under the count of the
Complaint alleging the non-constitutional torts of negligence, defamation
and invasion of privacy. However, Officer Leonard could not assert that
common law immunity in the count seeking damages for violation of the
search and seizure provisions of the Maryland Constitution. The Court
premised its ruling on the different functions served by the common law
and state constitutions:
[T]here are sound reasons to distinguish actions to remedy
constitutional violations from ordinary tort suits. The purpose of a
negligence or other ordinary tort action is not specifically to protect
government officials or to restrain government officials. The purpose
of these actions is to protect one individual against another
individual.... On the other hand, constitutional provisions ... are
specifically designed to protect citizens against certain types of
110. See McKenna, 763 N.W.2d 384 (Neb. 2009) (holding that Political Subdivision
Torts Act insulates city from liability for deprivation of state constitutional rights);
Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 507 (Ind. 2006) ("Unless the state Constitution
precludes statutory limitation of remedies for constitutional violations, the damage
remedy is itself subject to those statutory restrictions."); Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 128
(applying state statute defining immunity of individual officials to damage action for
violation of Montana Constitution); Begay v. New Mexico, 723 P.2d 252 (N.M. Ct. App.
1985) rev'd sub nom Smialek v. Begay, 721 P.2d 1306 (1986) (holding that because New
Mexico Tort Claims Act did not waive state's immunity for type of claim asserted by
plaintiff, state is immune from alleged violation of free exercise of religion guaranteed by
New Mexico Constitution).
111. See Fleming v. City of Bridgeport, 935 A.2d 126 (Conn. 2007) (applying
common law immunity for discretionary acts of municipal employees to suit for damages
for violations of Connecticut Constitution); Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198 (Haw. 1979)
(fact that state constitutional right was self-executing does not override sovereign
immunity of state from liability for damages); Ross/Pitts, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 206
(applying common law qualified immunity of state employees to action for violation of
state constitution).
112. Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 541 A.2d 1303 (Md. 1988).
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unlawful acts by government officials. To accord immunity to the
responsible government officials, and leave an individual remediless
when his constitutional rights are violated, would be inconsistent with
the purpose of the constitutional provisions." 3
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the rationale
justifying common law immunities may be inapplicable to
unconstitutional governmental conduct. In Owen v. City of
Independence,114 the Court held that local governments sued under
Section 1983 could not assert immunities available to individual
officials. At common law, municipalities were protected from liability
for their agents' good faith exercise of discretionary powers. Immunity
was accorded in order to prevent courts from second guessing policy
judgments of the local government. That immunity, however, lost its
raison d'etre when the conduct of the local government was challenged
as unconstitutional:
That common-law doctrine merely prevented courts from substituting
their own judgment on matters within the lawful discretion of the
municipality. But a municipality has no "discretion" to violate the
Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative. And
when a court passes judgment on the municipality's conduct in a
§ 1983 action, it does not seek to second guess the "reasonableness"
of the city's decision nor to interfere with the local government's
resolution of competing policy considerations. Rather, it looks only
to whether the municipality has conformed to the requirements of the
Federal Constitution and statutes.115
In sum, unless expressly adopted by a state legislature authorizing
civil actions to redress violation of state constitutions, the intent of the
1871 federal legislature that enacted Section 1983 is irrelevant to the
construction of the state civil rights act. The intent of that Congress,
113. Clea, 541 A.2dat 1314.
114. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
115. Owen, 445 U.S. at 649. Maryland courts similarly have refused to extend
common law immunity for governmental (as opposed to proprietary) activities to local
governments sued for deprivation of rights secured by the state constitution. See Ashton
v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995). Unlike local governments, the State of Maryland is
immune from suits for damages for violation of the state constitution:
The theory that, in the absence of a statute, the State itself cannot be held liable
in damages for acts which are unconstitutional rests upon public policy and a
theoretical notion of the "State." . . . "The 'State' spoken of in this rule [of
sovereign immunity] 'itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible,
immutable"' which can "'act only by law, [and] whatever it does say and do
must be lawful."' When the State's agents act wrongly, their acts are ultra
vires, and it is "the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons ... "
Ritchie v. Donnelly, 597 A.2d 432, 444 (Md. 1991).
904 [Vol. 115:4
REDRESSING DEPRIVATIONS OF RIGHTS
reflected in decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
Section 1983, is similarly inapposite to judicially authorized civil actions
seeking compensation for deprivations of state constitutional rights.
State law, rather than Section 1983, is the appropriate source of defenses
to liability for violation of the state constitution.
Even where the state legislature instructs courts to consult the
United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting Section 1983, there is
a second, independent reason state courts should not mimic the Court's
Section 1983 jurisprudence-the disparate bearing of federalism.
V. THE OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER SECTION
1983 ARE ANIMATED BY CONCERNS WITH FEDERALISM THAT ARE
IRRELEVANT TO STATE COURT ACTIONS TO REMEDY VIOLATIONS
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The three doctrines that inhibit the recovery of damages under
Section 1983 are fueled by Congress' and the Supreme Court's regard
for limiting the untoward federal regulation and supervision of state and
local governments. Just as the disparate relevance of federalism justifies
an independent construction of the substance of federal and state
constitutional rights, the absence of federalism constraints in state
constitutional litigation demands an assessment of remedies distinct from
Section 1983.
State courts have identified criteria that support interpreting state
constitutions to extend greater liberty to the citizenry than the protection
secured by the United States Constitution.'16 The text or constitutional
history of the state right may signal the framers' intent to accord broader
protection to the citizen than kindred rights in the federal Constitution.
Even where state and federal constitutional provisions are textually
identical and are aimed at balancing the same individual autonomy and
collective governmental interests, an additional factor justifies
independent interpretation of the state charter-the differential
pertinence of federalism.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that whenever
it is asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a liberty, the
Court will be mindful that recognizing a federal constitutional right
supplants the prerogative of states to regulate their own officials. In
ruling that the Texas system of funding public education did not offend
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
reasoned, in pertinent part:
116. See State v, Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
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It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the Equal
Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between
national and state power under our federal system. Questions of
federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether
a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial
scrutiny .... [T]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a
foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent
constitutional provisions under which this court examines state
action."] 17
Where a court is asked to declare whether government has violated
the state constitution, encroachment of federal power is no longer a
concern because the constitutional limitation on official conduct flows
from state law." 8 Furthermore, the restraint exerted by the constitution
does not extend beyond the geographic boundaries of the state. With
federalism removed from the calculus, a court may be more likely to find
that governmental interests do not outweigh the individual autonomy
protected by the state constitution.
117. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (quoting
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
The Court has admitted that the distribution of authority between the federal court and
state governments similarly impacts the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has sought to avoid a construction of due
process that would convert every injury inflicted by a state official, ordinarily remedied
by state tort law, into a constitutional violation redressed by federal courts. In Parratt v.
Taylor, the Court held a prison official's negligent loss of a prisoner's hobby kit did not
violate due process where it was impracticable to provide a hearing in advance of the loss
and the state provided an effective post-deprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981) overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). To hold
otherwise, the Court reasoned, "'would make the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort
law to be superimposed on whatever systems may already be administered by the
States."' Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). In
Daniels v. Williams, the Court ruled a prisoner could not file a federal constitutional
claim to recover damages suffered when he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the
stairs by a correctional officer because negligent action does not rise to a "deprivation"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (local officials have no duty
under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect a child from danger of abuse by his father
that the state played no part in creating; Due Process Clause "does not transform every
tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation."). Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986).
118. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1976) supplemented 569 P.2d
1303 (1977) (finding the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez
distinguishable because "[t]he constraints of federalism, so necessary to the proper
functioning of our unique system of national government, are not applicable to this court
in its determination of whether our own state's public school financing system runs afoul
of state constitutional provisions.").
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Although the 1871 Congress intended federal courts to displace
state courts as the enforcers of federal rights,"l9 the Supreme Court has
persistently invoked federalism to limit the availability of damages under
Section 1983. The lone basis on which the Supreme Court repudiated
vicarious municipal liability under Section 1983 was Congress'
reluctance to exert federal power over the states. Opponents of the
Sherman Amendment successfully argued that by seeking to hold local
governments liable for failing to prevent private acts of violence, the
federal government was indirectly mandating that local governments
organize and fund police departments-a power that rightfully reposed in
the states. That same hesitation to encroach on state autonomy, the Court
reasoned, led Congress to conclude that a municipality should not be
vicariously liable for constitutional deprivations caused by its
employees. 120
The Court's rulings that Congress did not intend to subject states to
liability for damages under Section 1983 also rests entirely upon regard
for federalism. In Quern v. Jordan, the Court held Congress did not
exercise its power to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity because there was no sufficiently explicit evidence in the
legislative history showing that Congress meant to disturb the traditional
immunity of states from having their conduct adjudged by federal
courts. 12 1 The Court's later holding in Will v. Michigan Department of
119. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of § 1983
was to interpose the federal courts between the State and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of
state law....").
120. The Supreme Court also has incanted federalism as a reason to heighten the
standard of culpability the plaintiff must prove to hold a local government liable for
deprivation of federal constitutional rights visited as a result of municipal "policy" under
Section 1983. In City of Canton v. Harris, the Court held cities are liable for
constitutional violations caused by failure to properly train their employees only where
the inadequacy in training rose to deliberate indifference. City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378 (1989). The Court reasoned a higher standard of fault was necessary to pre-
empt "serious questions of federalism" that would be triggered were federal courts to
second-guess local government's choice of employee training programs. Id. at 392. In
Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397 (1997), the Court required plaintiffs to prove even greater fault to subject local
governments to Section 1983 liability for hiring decisions. As with its failure to properly
train, a municipality could be held liable only where it was deliberately indifferent to the
risk that the hired employee would violate the Constitution. Id. at 410. However, the fact
it was obvious that the employee would disregard his constitutional obligations once
retained would not constitute deliberate indifference. Id. at 410-11. Rather, the local
government would be responsible only where it was "a plainly obvious consequence of
the hiring decisions" that the person hired "was highly likely to inflict the particular
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Id at 411. Any lesser standard of fault, the Court
reasoned, "raises serious federalism concerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing particular
hiring requirements that states have themselves elected not to impose." Id. at 415.
121. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1979).
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State Police that states are not "persons" within the meaning of Section
1983, and therefore not subject to suit in state court, is similarly
grounded in federalism.12 2 The Court found Congress' use of the general
term "person" in Section 1983 did not manifest the requisite clear intent
to "alter 'the usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government."' 1 23 The Court further concluded that the debates
fell short of the "clearly expressed legislative intent" necessary to
conclude Congress intended to invade the states' traditional insulation
from suit. 124
The role that federalism plays in the Supreme Court's qualified
immunity opinions is less explicit. However, federalism is implicit in the
origin of the immunity defense under Section 1983. Individual immunity
under Section 1983 is born from the presumption that Congress did not
intend to tamper with the common law rules by which states fixed the
liability of their officials for acts that violate state law.125
The federalism tinge to individual immunity is not limited to the
origins of the defense. At least one Justice has approved the enlargement
of qualified immunity in order to abate what he viewed as Section 1983's
untoward federal incursion into the rightful power of the states. While
conceding that qualified immunity is rooted in the 1871 Congress'
incorporation of then-existing state common law immunities, Justice
Scalia has refused to be shackled by that common law in defining
immunity under Section 1983.126 In his dissenting opinion in Crawford-
El v. Britton, Justice Scalia confessed that in construing the qualified
immunity defense, he uncharacteristically drifted from Congress' intent
in order to limit the expansion of federal power triggered by the Supreme
Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape:
122. Will v. Mich. Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
123. Id. at 65.
124. Id. at 69.
125. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
126. In Anderson v. Creighton, Justice Scalia rejected as "procrustean" the argument
that because officers conducting such searches were strictly liable at English common
law, FBI officials who searched plaintiffs' home could not assert a qualified immunity
defense :
[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can or
should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law.
That notion is plainly contradicted by Harlow, where the Court completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law....
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). See also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.
118, 135 (Scalia, J. concurring) (stating that Court's functional approach to absolute
immunity yields outcome dramatically opposed to common law; retreat from "faithful
adherence to the common law embodied in § 1983" is "so deeply embedded in our §
1983 jurisprudence that, for reasons of stare decisis, I would not abandon them now.").
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As I have observed earlier, our treatment of qualified immunity under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not purported to be faithful to the common law
immunities that existed when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute
presumably intended to subsume. That is perhaps just as well. The
§ 1983 that the Court created in 1961 bears scant resemblance to
what Congress enacted almost a century earlier. I refer, of course, to
the holding of Monroe v. Pape [citation omitted], which converted an
1871 statute covering constitutional violations committed "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any
State" into a statute covering constitutional violations without the
authority of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of
any State, and indeed even constitutional violations committed in
stark violation of state civil or criminal law.... Monroe changed a
statute that had generated only 21 cases in the first 50 years of its
existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands
of suits each year, and engages this Court in a losing struggle to
prevent the Constitution into a general tort law.... Applying normal
common law rules to the statute that Monroe created would carry us
further and further from what any sane Congress would have
enacted. 127
When a plaintiff asks a state court to remedy the deprivation of
rights secured by the state's own constitution, the federalism concerns
that impelled the Supreme Court to limit remedies under Section 1983
disappear. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that a state court
may grant equitable relief to redress state and local deprivations of
federal constitutional rights under circumstances where a federal court
must deny injunctive relief. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 28 the
federal district court ordered the City of Los Angeles to suspend its
policy that authorized law enforcement officers to use potentially lethal
chokeholds against citizens who posed no threat of death or serious
bodily injury. The Supreme Court reversed the injunction. The Court
reasoned that "recognition of the need for a proper balance between state
and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions
against state officers engaged in the administration of the state's criminal
laws. . . ."12 9 The Court then observed that because considerations of
federalism are absent where suit is brought in state court, the state
judiciary could adopt more generous standards for awarding equitable
relief against state and local police:
[T]he state courts need not impose the same standing or remedial
requirements that govern federal court proceedings. The individual
127. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
128. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
129. Id. at 112.
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States may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the
conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis. But
this is not the role of a federal court.... 130
As the Lyons Court recognized, with the yoke of federalism cast
aside, state courts may be more generous than federal courts in
remedying constitutional wrongs committed by state and local actors.
The principal obstacles to recovering damages under Section 1983-the
immunity of individual officials, the repudiation of vicarious entity
liability, and the absolution of states-all hinge upon Congress' and the
Court's ambition to moderate federal interference with the affairs of the
state. Accordingly, those Section 1983 doctrines are not appropriate
models for assigning responsibility for damages resulting from
deprivations of rights afforded by state constitutions. In Brown v. State
of New York, 13 1 the Court of Appeals of New York authorized a damage
action against the state for deprivation of state constitutional rights. The
majority properly refused the dissent's urging to follow the United States
Supreme Court's repudiation of state liability under Section 1983:
The dissent, relying on the restraint sometimes evident in Supreme
Court decisions involving constitutional torts, fails to recognize that
[ ] concerns of federalism underlie much of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to expand the relief available under section 1983 and
thereby unduly interfere with States' rights. 132
Even when interpreting state civil rights acts modeled after Section
1983, state courts must appreciate the heavy sway that federalism exerted
on current Section 1983 doctrine. In Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit and
Trust Company,133 the state court of appeals held that the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act (MCRA)134 imposes vicarious liability on employers for
civil rights violations committed by their agents. The defendant argued
that because the Massachusetts legislature used Section 1983 as a
template, the legislature intended to adopt the United States Supreme
Court's rejection of respondeat superior liability in Monell.135 The court
dismissed the argument, reasoning that "issues of federalism which led
Congress and the Supreme Court to reject vicarious liability under
130. Id. at 113.
131. Brown v. State of New York, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996).
132. Id. at 1143.
133. Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999).
134. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 1 IH-I (West 2010).
135. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit had predicted that the
Massachusetts courts would adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning to reject vicanous
liability under the MCRA. Lyons v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys. Inc., 30 F.3d 240, 245-47 (1st
Cir. 1994).
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§ 1983 do not bear on the MCRA, as our Legislature has authority to
impose liability on municipalities for the tortious acts of municipal
agents."1 3 6
This article so far has accepted the Supreme Court's representation
that the Congress that enacted Section 1983 intended a) to incorporate
common law immunities available to public officials, b) to reject
vicarious liability of local governmental entities, and c) to wholly exempt
states from liability for the wrongs of their agents. Even taking the
Court's reasoning at face value, the source of these doctrines, and the
federalism concerns that animate the outcomes, establish that state courts
should not extend the obstacles to Section 1983 liability to civil actions
claiming infringement of state constitutional rights. A critical
examination of the process by which the Supreme Court derived the
impediments to recovery of damages in its seminal Section 1983
opinions yields a third reason state courts should not uncritically adopt
the Court's constitutional remedies jurisprudence.
VI. IN ESTABLISHING THE OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
UNDER SECTION 1983, THE SUPREME COURT CONSISTENTLY
VIOLATED THE LIMITS ON ITS AUTHORITY DESIGNED TO PREVENT
THE COURT FROM ACTING AS A LEGISLATURE
The Supreme Court's consistent departure from what it has
prescribed as the ordinary and desired decision-making process supplies
an additional reason why state courts should not mindlessly follow that
Court's Section 1983 opinions. While the Court avowed to be
interpreting the intent of the legislature that enacted Section 1983, the
hurdles to recovering damages caused by deprivation of constitutional
rights are a product of the Supreme Court's own legislation.13 7
The notion of "Supreme Court legislation" ought to be an
oxymoron. The Constitution assigns the power to legislate to
Congress. 1 Where the issue before the Court is the interpretation of a
valid1 39 federal statute, the Court's sole role is to carry out the intent of
the Congress that enacted the law. The Court will not substitute its
policy preferences for the choices made by Congress, even where the
136. Sarvis, 711 N.E.2d at 919.
137. The Supreme Court's legislative behavior is more fully documented in Gary S.
Gildin, The Supreme Court's Legislative Agenda to Free Government from
Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1333 (2010).
138. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
139. Of course, the Court will and should strike down legislation where Congress
lacked the power to enact the statute. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(holding Congress did not have power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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Court vigorously disagrees with congressional judgment. In Tower v.
Glover,14 0 the Court held that public defenders sued under Section 1983
may not assert immunity because no immunity protected public
defenders at common law. The Court rejected the public defenders'
entreaty that the policies justifying immunity for judges and prosecutors
supported similar immunity for public defenders:
Petitioners' concerns may be well founded, but the remedy
petitioners urge is not for us to adopt. We do not have a license to
establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interest of what we
judge to be sound public policy. It is for Congress to determine
whether § 1983 litigation has become too burdensome to state or
federal institutions and, if so, what remedial action is appropriate.141
The Court has accepted three limits on its authority that are
designed to keep the Court from behaving like a legislature. First, as a
general rule, the Court will not address an issue that was not presented to
the district court and court of appeals.14 2 Rather than forward its own
policy agenda, the Court sits as a court of review, scrutinizing only those
matters that actually were lodged before the lower courts.14 3 Only in the
most exceptional cases will the Court deviate from the requirement that
an issue be preserved below in order to merit consideration by the
Court.144
The Supreme Court's own rules create a second buffer against
judicial legislation. Even when an issue has been raised and preserved in
the lower courts, the Court will not address the issue unless the parties
also have properly presented the matter to the Court. The Court limits its
review to issues set out in, or fairly comprised within, the question
presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari.14 5 Neither the briefs of
140. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
141. Id. at 922-23.
142. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189,
195 n.2 (1989) (refusing to consider an argument supporting constitutional duty of
government to take affirmative action to protect Joshua DeShaney from abuse).
143. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit
like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual
expediency.").
144. The Court limited the circumstances under which it will review an issue that was
not raised below to remedy a "plain error." See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159
(2010); Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423 (2009); United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985); FED R. CRIM. P. 52; FED. R.
EvID. 103(d).
145. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a). See also SUP. CT. R. 15(2) (party opposing certiorari
waives "[a]ny objection to consideration of a question presented based on what occurred
in the proceedings below, if the objection does not go to jurisdiction ... unless called to
the Court's attention in the brief in opposition.").
[Vol. 115:4912
REDRESSING DEPRIVATIONS OF RIGHTS
the parties nor their oral argument may raise additional questions that
were not presented in that initial petition. 146 Like the preservation of
error requirement, the Supreme Court's rules envision the Justices as the
umpires of legal and policy arguments raised by the litigants, rather than
legislators. As then-Judge Scalia explained, "[t]he premise of our
adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed
boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal
questions presented and argued by the parties before them."1 4 7
Finally, the Court has strictly applied the constitutional limitation on
the authority of the judiciary. Article III confines judicial power to
actual "cases and controversies."1 48 The Court has interpreted the "case
and controversy" requirement to deprive the Court of the power to decide
an issue unless a) the issue is actually presented by the facts of the case,
and b) it is necessary for the Court to resolve the issue. 149 Unless both
requisites are satisfied, Article III precludes the Court from addressing an
issue, even where the argument is both properly preserved before the
lower courts and actually presented to the Supreme Court in the petition
for writ of certiorari and briefs on the merits. Once again, the Court has
shied away from exercising any legislative function, viewing its lone role
as evaluating arguments developed and proffered by litigants who
possess an actual, extra-legal interest in the position asserted. The Court
will refuse to decide issues "not pressed before the Court with that clear
concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and
necessary for decision from a clash of adversary arguments exploring
every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and
demanding interests."so
In contrast to the Court's self-professed aversion to behaving as a
legislature, the Court habitually exceeded all three limitations on its
power in promulgating the obstacles to recovery of damages under
Section 1983. In a trilogy of qualified immunity cases-Wood v.
146. SUP. CT. R. 24.1(a) and 28.1. "[O]nly in most exceptional cases" will the Court
decide matters not included in the question presented to cure "plain error." Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32 (1993).
147. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
148. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
149. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court overturned the preliminary injunction
that prohibited City of Los Angeles police officers from using potentially deadly
chokeholds against citizens who posed no risk of causing serious harm. City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Lyons had been subjected to a chokehold after
being stopped for a burnt out tail light, and sued for damages caused by application of the
chokehold. However, the Court held Lyons did not meet the article's "case or
controversy" requirement for an injunction because it was speculative that he would be
subjected to an unwarranted chokehold in the future. Id. at 100-01.
150. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
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Strickland,15' Procunier v. Navarette,152 and Harlow v. Fitzgerald' 53 -
the Court expanded the circumstances under which a public official
would escape liability for damages caused by her unconstitutional
conduct. In each of these cases, the Court not only departed from the
common law test it had held Congress intended,' 54 but legislated a new,
pro-government immunity standard that a) was not argued to or ruled
upon by the lower courts; b) was not advocated by the parties before the
Supreme Court; and c) was not presented by the facts and necessary to
the decision as required by Article III.1ss
The Court similarly disregarded limitations on its power when it
held that local governments are not vicariously liable for deprivations of
constitutional liberties caused by their employees. Neither party in
Monell5 6 raised the issue of respondeat superior liability before the
lower courts or the Supreme Court.'5 7  Indeed, during oral argument,
plaintiffs counsel expressly told the Court that he was not advocating
that local governments should be vicariously liable under Section
1983.58 As Justice Stevens later acknowledged, "[t]he commentary on
respondeat superior in Monell was not responsive to any argument
advanced by either party." 5 9 Since it was undisputed that the actions of
the government constituted "policy," it was not necessary for the Monell
Court to adjudge whether, under a different set of facts, local
governments could be vicariously liable for all unconstitutional acts of
their officials.
In Quern v. Jordan,'60 the Court ruled that Congress did not intend
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court when it enacted Section 1983. In the lower courts, neither
party raised the issue of Congress' intent to override the Eleventh
Amendment. Both parties advised the Supreme Court that the Court
need not decide whether Congress meant to permit damage actions
151. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (introducing the concept of "clearly
established law" into immunity analysis).
152. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (providing that an official
automatically satisfies the objective tier of immunity whenever a right violated was not
clearly established).
153. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (providing that an official is immune
whenever a right is not clearly established, even if that official is acting maliciously).
154. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 415-16 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The truth to tell, Procunier v. Navarette ... did not trouble itself with
history . . . but simply set forth a policy prescription.").
155. See Gildin, supra note 137, at 1347-63.
156. Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Services., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
157. See generally id.
158. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (No. 75-1914).
159. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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against states under Section 1983.161 As Justice Brennan lamented in
Quern, "[i]t is deeply disturbing ... that the Court should engage in
today's gratuitous departure from customary judicial practice and reach
out to decide an issue unnecessary to its holding." 6 2
State courts and legislatures tempted to look to Section 1983
jurisprudence in determining the rules for recovering damages for
deprivation of state constitutional rights must be mindful that the United
States Supreme Court unnecessarily decided the pivotal issues that
shelter public officials and entities from liability-and did so without the
benefit of the views of the lower federal courts or the parties before the
Court. The perspective of the lower courts and vigorous advocacy by the
parties are prerequisites to sound decision-making. As one commentator
noted, when a court decides an issue on its own volition, "the losing
party has had no opportunity to rebut the argument accepted by the court,
which may in fact be erroneous, and the court has received no assistance
in deciding the question from the litigants who are well informed in the
matter."l 6 3 Accordingly, United States Supreme Court interpretations of
federal law on matters not argued by counsel exert less precedential
sway, even upon courts bound by those decisions. In Monell, Justice
Powell concurred in the Court's departure from stare decisis since the
Monroe Court had repudiated municipal liability on a ground not
advanced by either party nor required to dispose of the case:
Any overruling of prior precedent, whether of constitutional decision
or otherwise, disserves to some extent the value of certainty. But I
think we owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was
rendered without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant
considerations. That is the premise of the canon of interpretation that
language in a decision not necessary to the holding may be accorded
less weight in subsequent cases.
Of course, United States Supreme Court interpretations of Section
1983 are not binding on state courts determining when to award damages
for deprivations of state constitutional liberties. The Court's departures
from its normal decision-making processes, however, supply an
additional reason why state courts (and legislatures) must be wary of
mimicking the Court's Section 1983 interpretations in actions for
damages for violation of state constitutional rights.
161. Brief for the Respondent at 55 n.37, Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (No. 77-841); Reply
Brief from the State Petitioner at 14, Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (No. 77-841). See Gildin,
supra note 137, at 1368-74.
162. Quern, 440 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring).
163. Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L.
REv. 477, 487 (1958-59).
164. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's sua sponte interpretations of Section 1983 do
not set forth a constitutionally mandated or universally accepted view of
who should bear the risk of loss when a public official trammels a
constitutionally-guaranteed liberty. The Court's decisions are an
admixture of 1) the purported intent of the 1871 Congress; 2) the concern
that the federal government not unduly interfere with state courts and
state officials; and 3) the Court's own policy preferences, unnecessarily
"legislated" without the views of the lower courts and parties before the
Court.
The Supreme Court neglected to consider the cumulative effect of
its decisions on the ability of victims of constitutional wrongdoing to be
compensated for their injuries. 16 In order to allow officials to exercise
their discretion free from the undue fear of liability or the burdens of
litigation, the Court has continually expanded the circumstances under
which qualified immunity shelters individual public officials from paying
damages. While the common law required official action to be in good
faith and reasonable under all the circumstances to merit immunity,
qualified immunity under Section 1983 is extended whenever the
constitutional right violated was not clearly established. 166  By the
Court's own reckoning, qualified immunity now protects "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."16 7  In
separate silos of cases, the Court entirely exonerated states from paying
damages and repudiated respondeat superior liability of local
governments. The Court did not consider the interaction of the three
lines of doctrine. However, whenever a state official is immune, the
person whose constitutional rights have been violated will receive no
compensation for the damages suffered as a consequence of the
deprivation. Similarly, except in the increasingly narrow circumstances
where the infringement of constitutional liberties represents
governmental policy or custom, 168 persons injured by local government
officials will be denied damages whenever the right violated was not
clearly established.
The combined effect of the Court's individual decisions may not
even fulfill the Court's own view of the optimal apportionment of the
risk of loss from constitutional wrongs. In Owen v. City of
165. See Gary S. Gildin, Strip Searches and the Silo Effect: Accepting a Holistic
Approach to Charter Remedies, in TAKING REMEDIES SERIOUSLY 229, 229-54 (Justice
Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach eds., 2009).
166. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
167. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
168. Monell, 436 U.S. at 713-14 (1978).
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Independence,'69 the Court held that local governmental entities could
not assert any immunity defense in Section 1983 actions. The Court
reasoned that allowing the citizen to recover damages for his injuries is
"a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished
constitutional guarantees."7 e The prospect of damages liability also
deters future deprivations of constitutional rights by "creat[ing] an
incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of
their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens'
constitutional rights."171  Holding entities accountable to pay damages
supplies an additional deterrent, "encourag[ing] those in a policymaking
position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the
likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights."l72
The Court's current doctrine is a far cry from the ideal it articulated in
Owen. Yet, the Court has never offered a rationale for leaving the victim
without compensation for losing the most fundamental and precious
liberties in society.
There are several alternate models of risk allocation available to
state courts and legislatures crafting remedies for deprivation of rights
secured by the state constitution. First, the state could opt to ensure
compensation to the citizen and maximize the deterrence of state
constitutional violations by holding both the entity and public official
liable. The Maryland high court endorsed the compensatory scheme
envisioned by Owen v. City of Independence in explaining why it is
appropriate that individual officials and entities have no immunity from
payment of damages for violations of the state constitution:
169. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
170. Id. at 651. The case law in effect at the time the Court decided Owen already
had undermined the professed goal of assuring compensation to victims of constitutional
wrongdoing. Because the Court had rejected vicarious municipal liability, the citizen
could not recover damages where the individual official was immune and the violation of
the constitution did not amount to governmental policy or custom. The Court's post-
Owen decisions further undermined the compensation and deterrence idealized in Owen.
The Court's restrictive interpretation of which local governmental acts constitute policy
and the Court's complete repudiation of state liability widened the circumstances in
which the public will not bear the cost of its government's unconstitutional activities.
See Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (local government not
liable for constitutional violation caused by hiring decision unless entity was deliberately
indifferent to risk that applicant would commit the particular constitutional violation
giving rise to the Section 1983 action); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
(city not liable for constitutional violations caused by failure to train unless need for
training was so plainly obvious that failure to provide guidance amounts to deliberate
indifference); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (only acts of select
officials who exercise "final authority" under state law constitute policy giving rise to
municipal liability).
171. Owen, 445 U.S. at 651-52.
172. Id. at 652.
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It hardly seems unjust to require a municipal defendant which has
violated a citizen's constitutional rights to compensate him for the
injury suffered thereby.... Even where some constitutional
development could not have been foreseen by municipal officials, it
is fairer to allocate any resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs
of government borne by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to
be felt solely by those whose rights, albeit newly recognized, have
been violated.
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that holding the entity as
well as the individual liable would best deter deprivations of state
constitutional rights by creating a financial incentive a) to afford
adequate training; b) to supply proper supervision; and c) to discipline or
fire incompetent employees. Beyond the compensation and deterrent
functions, the court noted, guaranteeing a damage remedy confers
legitimacy upon a government proclaiming that its power is limited by
rights enshrined in the state constitution:
[N]o government can sustain itself, much less flourish, unless it
affirms and reinforces the fundamental values that define it by
placing the moral and coercive powers of the State behind those
values. When the law immunizes official violations of substantive
rules because the cost or bother of doing otherwise is too great,
thereby leaving victims without any realistic remedy, the integrity of
the rules and their underlying public values are called into
question.'74
Secondly, if the state believes the specter of liability for state
constitutional violations will unduly hinder individuals from seeking
public office or executing their duties once on the job, the state could
afford absolute immunity to the individual officer but hold the entity
vicariously liable.s75 In Corum v. University of North Carolina,176 the
173. Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 463 (Md. 1995) (quoting Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654-55 (1980)).
174. Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1144 (N.Y. 1996).
175. Several foreign jurisdictions have held entities liable for damages caused by their
officials' infringement of constitutional rights. See Vancouver (City) v. Ward, [2010]
S.C.R. 27 (Can.) (affirming award of $5000 in damages against province of British
Columbia for breach of a citizen's rights under Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms); Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop, [2005] UKPC 15,
[2006] 1 A.C. 328, available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/
Att%20General%20v.%20ramanoop.rtf (finding that because deterrence of future
breaches of a constitutional right is valid object of public law damages, and fact right was
constitutionally protected "adds an extra dimension to the wrong,"); New South Wales v.
Ibbett, [2006] HCA, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cases/cth/HCA/ 2006/57.html
(Crown liable for compensatory and punitive damages for actions of plainclothes police
officer who pointed gun at plaintiff mother, ordered her to open door, and took son from
home in handcuffs). Similarly, under the European Court of Human Rights system, the
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state supreme court held that the purpose of the Declaration of Rights of
the North Carolina Constitution was to protect the citizenry against the
State rather than against individuals. Hence, courts may not require state
officials to pay damages caused by deprivation of rights secured by the
state constitution. Rather, it is the state itself that should bear the loss.
The court rejected the state's assertion of sovereign immunity, finding
immunity inimical to the nature of state constitutional rights:
[I]n determining the rights of citizens under the Declaration of Rights
of our Constitution, it is the judiciary's responsibility to guard and
protect those rights. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot
stand as a barrier to North Carolina citizens who seek to remedy
violation of their rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights. It
would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the one hand that
citizens have constitutional individual civil rights that are protected
by encroachment actions by the State, while on the other hand saying
that individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by the
State cannot sue because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity....
[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is not a constitutional right; it
is a common law theory or defense established by this Court. ...
Thus when there is a clash between these constitutional rights and
sovereign immunity, the constitutional right must prevail.177
Third, the court could hold the entity liable while preserving
individual accountability for conduct that not only violates the state
constitution, but also is accompanied by an additional quantum of
culpability. Should the state opt to afford a qualified immunity to
individual officials, that immunity need not and should not replicate the
immunity crafted by the United States Supreme Court for Section 1983
actions. This article has reviewed the statutory origin, federalism tinge,
and Supreme Court legislation that accounts for the present scope of
qualified immunity in Section 1983 actions. As a result, Section 1983
affords more extensive protection to official wrongdoing than immunity
currently extended by state law. 8 It is difficult to muster a policy
nation responsible for the human rights violation is held accountable for the softline
damages resulting from the encroachment. See European Court of Human Rights Finds
Violations in Bulgarian Police Brutality Case involving Romani Victims, EUROPEAN
ROMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, Jan. 8, 2010, available at http:www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=
3059 (awarding three Bulgarian nationals 4,500 euros each for inhuman and degrading
treatment at the hands of Bulgarian police in violation of Articles 3 and 41 of the
European Convention on Human Rights).
176. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).
177. Id. at 291-92.
178. When it abrogated the subjective prong of the test, the Supreme Court
immunized intentional and malicious violations of the Constitution. Harlow v.
9192011]
PENN STATE LAw REVIEW
justification for freeing public officials from accountability for
deprivations of state constitutional rights under circumstances where they
would be liable for infringement of common law rights. If the state
elects to provide immunity for violation of the state constitution, that
immunity should be equivalent to, or narrower than, state law immunity
for non-constitutional wrongs.
Finally, states could devise alternatives to civil actions for damages
that will afford a measure of meaningful relief to the innocent citizen
while not unduly deterring government's ability to perform and fund its
necessary functions. Among other things, the state could adopt or extend
administrative or special tort claim tribunals to redress assertions of state
constitutional violations. 179 In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals of
New York construed actions for violation of the state constitution to be a
species of tort that fall within the statute waiving immunity and
providing jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for tort actions against the
state. 18
Justice Brandeis famously stated of state constitutionalism, "It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). State statutes, however, routinely deny immunity to
officials for intentional wrongs and actions taken in bad faith. See statutes compiled at
Gary S. Gildin, Dis-Qualified Immunity for Discrimination Against the Disabled, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REv. 897, 942 n.236 (1999). The Supreme Court's re-definition of the objective
tier immunized conduct that is objectively unreasonable under all the circumstances
whenever the constitutional right was not clearly established. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.
183 (1984); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). By contrast, some state
statutes deny immunity to officials who act negligently or recklessly. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-820.02 (2009) (public employee immune unless he "intended to cause
injury or was grossly negligent."); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 844.6(d) (West 2009) (immunity
of public employee for injury to prisoner does not extend to "injury proximately caused
by his negligent or wrongful act or omission."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(1) (2011)
(employee acing without malice not liable for claims arising out of act or omission of the
employee "exercising ordinary care" in reliance on performance of statutory or regulatory
function).
180. France utilizes an administrative body to adjudicate claimed civil wrongs
committed by government officials. The Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) sits as the
nation's highest administrative court and is organized into five sections. See James E.
Pfander, Governmental Accountability in Europe: A Comparative Assessment, 35 GEO
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 611, 623 (2003) (citing John Bell, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1992)). The section du Contentieux (Litigation Division) hears constitutional tort claims.
See Case Tomaso-Grecco, Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State], Feb. 10, 1905,139,
translated in http://www.utexas.edullaw/academics/centers/transnational/work new/
French/case.php?id=1041 (holding that state is liable for damages in the amount of
15,000 francs for gendarme's firing of a gun in an attempt to stop mad bull on the loose,
striking claimant inside his house). The Federal Tort Claims Act establishes a procedure
by which claims of damages caused by actions of federal officials that are tortious under
state law are initially adjudicated by the agency out of whose actions the claim arose. See
28 U.S.C. §2401(b) (2011).
181. Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996).
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REDRESSING DEPRIVATIONS OF RIGHTS
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."' States have the opportunity to live up to Justice Brandeis'
exhortation as they embark on the designing of remedies for invasions of
state constitutional rights. The remedial doctrines each state ultimately
adopts will dictate 1) the extent to which its citizens are compensated for
injuries suffered as a result of deprivations of rights secured by state
constitutions; 2) the degree to which its public officials will feel deterred
from violating state constitutional constraints; and 3) the fullness of the
state's commitment to limits on its power to invade fundamental
freedoms of its citizenry enshrined in the state constitution.
State courts and legislatures must be cognizant of the unique factors
that have shaped the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence of
remedies for violating the federal Constitution. Over the first generation
of state constitutionalism, state courts have come to acknowledge that
many of the forces influencing the definition of federal constitutional
rights do not apply to liberties ensured by state constitutions. In the same
vein, the United States Supreme Court's Section 1983 remedies doctrine
is a product of statutory, structural, and institutional variables that do not
automatically or comfortably extend to the state constitutional realm.
Accordingly, as state courts and legislatures enter the second generation
of state constitutionalism, they must step outside the shadow of the
Supreme Court's Section 1983 decisions to develop an independent
scheme of redressing deprivations of state constitutional rights.
182. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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